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BOOK REVIEWS

ACKERMAN-PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION.
New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. 303.
In law school, I once came across a collection of readings on the economics of property law which was edited by Professor Ackerman.' He
personally authored the introduction, and I was very pleasantly surprised
to see a lawyer produce a superbly clear account of welfare economics--especially its limitations and (usually unstated) assumptions.
That favorable impression remained in the back of my mind until
more recently, when I was introduced to this work on the theoretical aspects of the just compensation clause. I soon discovered the basic reason
for my attraction to his writing-we are in complete agreement on a crucial and controversial premise. As stated by Ackerman:
[I]t is only after resolving certain philosophical issues that one can
make sense of the constitutional question, let alone pretend to expound
a correct constitutional answer. Philosophy decides cases; and hard philosophy at that.
Now this, I confess, represents my general view of the proper relationship between philosophy and constitutional law. It is moreover, a
view that accords a role to theory far greater than that granted generally by the profession. Nevertheless ....
analysts must become philoso2
phers if they wish to remain lawyers.
It is the distinctive accomplishment of this marvelously straightforward book that Ackerman shows, in the context of a very real legal problem, the illumination which is possible by imaginative yet careful philosophy. At stake is the raising of the level of discourse in legal education
and, ultimately, the profession.
AcKEmAMN's THESIs
Consider the now ubiquitous phenomenon of governmental action
which changes the relations of persons with respect to things in such a
way to cause loss to some persons in the name of public welfare. The
loser, it is assumed, goes to the courts to demand compensation, citing
the fifth amendment's mandate: "Nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."'3 Ackerman: "[I]t is the fate of
OF PROPERTY LAW (1975).
B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1977).

1. B. AcKERmAN, EcONOMIc FOUNDATIONS
2.

3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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those called upon to sacrifice for the public good that will concern us in
this essay: When may they justly demand that the state compensate
them
4
for the financial sacrifices they are called upon to make?'
The analysis is in two steps and is easily generalizable to any particular substantive question of law. First, Ackerman develops two broad approaches to adjudication from which an American judge of today would
realistically be expected to choose in making the decision put before him.5
These approaches, denominated that of the "Scientific Policymaker" and
that of the "Ordinary Observer," are two of the four possible combinations of two independent choices. The first, "Ordinary" versus "Scientific," refers to a choice between attitudes toward legal language. The Ordinary adjudicator insists that one keep in mind that legal language is
grounded in ordinary language; whereas the Scientific adjudicator is willing to accept and use legal language as developed into a technical vocabulary, with definitions which may retain little of the meanings of ordinary
language from which the terms are originally drawn.
The second basis for comparison, "Observer" versus "Policymaker,"
refers to the adjudicator's attitude toward the normative aspects of the
legal system as a whole. The Policymaker views his function as one of
identifying the rules and principles describing the abstract ideals which
the legal system furthers, a self-consistent whole denominated the "Comprehensive View." The Observer, who may or may not believe there is
such a Comprehensive View, denies that analysis should begin by choosing one. Rather, he asserts that adjudication should vindicate the expectations generated by the dominant social institutions.
These two degrees of freedom are combined to form the Ordinary
Observer, the Ordinary Policymaker, the Scientific Observer, and the Scientific Policymaker. After rejecting the Ordinary Policymaker and the
Scientific Observer as too divergent from the current mainstream of
American law, Ackerman sets out to outline the distinctive features of the
other, more relevant two.8
In the second step of the analysis, Ackerman argues that the unintelligibility of the present "takings" law to critics (and judges) arises from
their belief that a principled explanation of the decisions which have been
made in the area must be in the form of a Scientific Policymaker's analysis. He demonstrates that the established jurisprudence can be made intelligible (not to say justified) by using the approach of the Ordinary Observer.7 Notwithstanding its usefulness, however, Ackerman points out
that the Ordinary Observer's approach suffers not only from inadequate
theoretical elaboration but also from a declining popularity among academicians, himself included.
Ackerman concludes that there is an impending conflict, in which the
age of "happy ignorance" in American law must yield to "methodological
4. B. ACKERMAN,
5. See id. ch. 1.

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

1 (1977).

6. See id. chs. 2-5.
7. See id. ch. 6.
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self-consciousness" concerning the "relative merits of Scientific Policymaking and Ordinary Observing." 8 However, this self-consciousness
would not necessitate a choice between these two approaches. There are
several sections in the book in which Ackerman suggests hybrid
possibilities.9
SOME ELABORATION AND SOME CRITICISM

At the certainty (not risk) of over-simplification, I shall exemplify
the analysis. The takings clause infers that a taking by the state is acceptable if just compensation is made. This is accepted in both modes of
analysis discussed by Ackerman; the empirical element of all alternatives
considered is manifest, the goal being primarily to ascertain the law, not
to posit the best law entirely free of constraints of history and institutions. Similarly, "private property" is assumed to refer to those forms of
property rights actually recognized in Anglo-American law, as opposed to
those forms which completely unrestrained versions of these philosophical
approaches would consider justified.
For the Ordinary Observer all property can be divided into two categories: "social property" and "legal property." (This is the crucial distinction of the book.) Social property is the set of property rights familiar
enough to the layman that he and his peers readily discern what belongs
to whom: my book; his house; her automobile. Legal property is that
which is of such a technical character that the layman knows that he
must consult a lawyer to determine people's respective rights thereto: my
subsurface mineral rights; your air and light easement; his patent; my
speculative investment in undeveloped Blackacre. To the Scientific Policymaker, this categorization is interesting perhaps, but of no constitutional significance of its own. To the Ordinary Observer, however, this
distinction is fundamental, for he will be significantly more inclined to
give constitutional protection to property forms rooted in lay language
and expectations-social property-than to other, more technical kinds.
For the Scientific Policymaker it is much more important, in determining when compensation is to be paid, to focus on the Comprehensive
View that he imputes to the legal system. Ackerman considers two candidates for such a Comprehensive View, fully recognizing that two examples
do not a universe exhaust.
The first is the Utilitarian Comprehensive View, exemplified by the
analyses of Professors Posner, Michelman, and Sax. For the judge inclined to believe that this View is the one underlying our legal system, the
crucial concern is the relationship between (1) (assuming compensation is
to be granted), the costs of processing compensation claims and (2) (assuming a denial of compensation) the sum of uncertainty costs due to
placing similarly situated property owners in fear of the non-judicial
branches of government and the costs of citizen disaffection with a sys8. Id. at 168. See also id. ch. 7.
9. Id. at 76, 110-12, 183-84.
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tern that does not follow their honest (though possibly wrong) opinion as
to proper social-welfare maximization.
The critical question, in any given class of cases, is whether P > U +
D, where P = process costs, U = uncertainty costs, and D = the costs
of citizen disaffection. If P > U + D, compensation should be denied;
if P < U + D, it should be granted. To put the point in terms more
useful to our courts, restrained Utilitarian judges should be more responsive to just compensation claims as process costs decline, as uncertainty costs increase, and as the general utility of the legislation is increasingly subject to reasonable doubt. 10
Now, it would seem that a factor for citizen disaffection should appear on both sides of the formula, since such disaffection may just as well
result, albeit in different persons, from a decision, or pattern of decisions,
granting compensation. Neverthless, I agree with Ackerman's conclusion
that these considerations show little similarity to established legal reasoning. And that is the point he wishes to make.
The other Scientific approach considered is "Kantian" Policymaking.
Ackerman's Kantian Comprehensive View encompasses a rather large bag
of intellectual trends, including those associated with Rawls, Nozick,
Wolff, Waltzer, Freed, and Dworkin. This simplification is not too gross,
for, as Ackerman points out, they have in common a rejuvenated concern
for individual rights, even to the point of denying social-welfare maximization if necessary. In this sense, the theories of such writers reflect a
Kantian categorical imperative: that policymakers "are not to conceive of
their fellow citizens as merely means to the larger end of maximizing so'
cial utility, but are instead to treat them as ends in themselves."11
Reasoning from this, Ackerman concludes that a "Kantian judiciary (like a
Utilitarian one) would tend to expand very considerably the
contexts in
12
which compensation would be constitutionally compelled.
Although I agree once more with the conclusion, I have several criticisms here. I mention only those concerning Professor Ackerman's main
example of Kantian analysis. He states that the "easy" case for the Kantian judge would be the one in which overall social utility rises by more
than the loss in market value to the subject property owners. In such a
case, market-value compensation would leave the property owner "no
worse off" while still effectuating a social gain.1 3 This analysis strikes me
as peculiar in two respects. First, I see no reason to say that this case is
any easier than the one in which market value compensation would equal
or exceed the social gain. If the imperative has any content, certainly it is
that the decision whether to grant compensation rests upon considerations wholly distinct from social utility. In fact, a Kantian may not even
regard "social utility" as intelligible. The case posed is only easier for a
10. Id. at 48-49.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id. at 86.
13. Id. at 73.
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judge who is trying to reach a compromise between Utilitarian and Kantian Comprehensive views.
Second, as Ackerman belatedly recognizes, 14 market-value compensation, even computed without regard to the instant state project and its
attendant increase in demand, ignores the fundamental operative force
behind market exchanges: the differences between the values of a property interest to the seller (Vs) and buyer (Vb) and the value of the market
price (P) to the seller (P,) and buyer (Pb)" Unless V,<P s and Vb>Pb,
there would be no free exchange. (It will be noted that I did not make the
typical Utilitarian's mistake of formulating the condition as "V<P<Vb";

V, and Vb are measured in noncomparable, subjective "utils," and P is
typically in the units of a currency. This mistake is ubiquitous in welfare
economics.) It is clear that if a property owner is not willing to sell at the
market price (i.e., V 8>P), then forcing him to accept the market price
and give up the property can hardly be said to leave him no worse off.
Once more, these modifications do not seriously detract from Ackerman's basic thesis. He maintains that Scientific Policymaking adjudicators, of either a Utilitarian or Kantian persuasion, would not reason the
way judges actually do; and the Ordinary Observer's distinction between
social and legal property gives a better account of the resolutions, and the
difficulties thereof, which are found in the decided cases. Ackerman's exemplifications of these propositions are contained in Chapter 6, and it is a
showing that is highly illuminating. It is not, however, without difficulties,
the most important of which, in my view, is an insufficient account of the
possibility of a competing explanation based upon a "reformist" but "deferential" Kantian judiciary, one hostile to many of the existing forms of
"legal" property. This criticism can only be understood after examining
another portion of Ackerman's theory, to which I now turn.
THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL ROLE

I must apologize to Professor Ackerman for deleting from the foregoing his theory of judicial role. The judge's perception of his proper place
in the constitutional scheme is an obviously critical element of the analysis. Ackerman's discussion of judicial role is interesting in its own right; it
also introduces significant refinements into the analysis that has already
been described. I will not attempt to develop these refinements here but
shall be content to suggest the general character of his theory of judicial
role.
The "First Principles of Role Theory" 1 5 reflect the basic features of
the Ordinary Observer and the Scientific Policymaker discussed above.
The emphasis of the Ordinary Observer upon understanding and reinforcing the layman's expectations leads to the "FirstPrincipleof the Ordinary Observer's Judicial Role: While the judge has it in his power to
act like a law-maker, he should not use this power to further his own
14.
15.

See id. at 140-41.
Id. at 103-06.
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personal predilections but should instead think about each lawsuit as if
he were a law-taker."'16
To the Scientific Policymaker, acceptance of this principle constitutes "intellectual suicide" and an unjustifiable deference to laymen's expectations, "whose only claim to legitimacy lies in their brute existence. 117 Accordingly, the Scientific Policymaker's willingness to identify
the Comprehensive View of the legal system leads to the "FirstPrinciple
of the Scientific Policymaker's JudicialRole":

While the judge has it in his power to act as a law-maker, he should not
use this power to further his personal predilections, but instead should
think about each lawsuit as if he were an agent of the state charged
with implementing the public good as it is defined in the legal system's Comprehensive View.18

Of course, the Ordinary Observer sees this as an excuse for the judge
using his own idiosyncratic notions of the public good.
Beyond these first principles, there are several ways in which Scientific Policymakers and Ordinary Observers can exercise judicial restraint
9 Depending
or judicial innovation.1
upon their opinion concerning the
general propriety, from the point of view of the appropriate "First Principle," of the distribution of property rights prior to the alleged "taking,"
judges may be conservative or reformist. Depending upon their opinion of
the general propriety of actions by the other branches of government,
they may be deferential or activist. And depending upon the extent to
which they are willing to take into consideration the possible existence of
a significant group of individuals who do not share the imputed Comprehensive View or dominant social expectations, they may be principled
(i.e., they assume no such group exists) or pragmatic.
This breakdown has the advantage of showing that judicial restraint
and innovation have several components, and that judges may consistently be restrained in some ways and innovative in others. The components assumed make a great difference in the probable results of the adjudication of a takings question, and it is important, therefore, to know
what can be said about the propensities of Utilitarian Policymakers,
Kantian Policymakers, and Ordinary Observers toward restraint or innovation along each of the divisions indicated. Ackerman deals with these
questions, but I will not attempt to do so here.
REVELATIONS

Lest the reader think that this book is totally dry and theoretical, it
should be added that Ackerman provides along the way a few insights
which are ironic and sometimes surprising, a situation which seems often
to accompany increased understanding. One example will suffice. One
16. Id. at 105.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 106.
19. Id. at 31-39, 106-10.
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would expect an activist utilitarian judge to be more disposed (than a
deferential utilitarian judge) to grant compensation in the struggle between nonjudicial branches of government and property owners claiming
under the just compensation clause. But there is an activist (or perhaps
reformist) utilitarian interpretation which cuts the other way, suggesting
(it is thought) a restriction in the scope of compensation. Ackerman attributes this to the later work of Professor Sax and argues that Sax's position is unfounded.2 0
Sax's position is that, due to the "free-rider" effect, groups representing small, diffuse interests of larger numbers of neighbors of the property
owners in question will be at a disadvantage in the political arena vis-avis well-organized factions of such property owners. Therefore, it is said,
maximization of social utility requires that help be given to the environmentalists, for example, to counterbalance a free-rider's reluctance to
contribute resources to the cause. One form of such help is seen to consist
of removing this compensation requirement as an obstacle in the environmentalists' path.
Ackerman responds that the primary reason for the organization of
the property owners into an effective political force in opposition to the
environmentalists is that these owners fear political action that will entail
severe economic loss to them. If, however, compensation is liberally
granted, such fear will be drastically reduced, with the consequence that
the opposition which environmentalists face will be that of the taxpayers
who fund the compensation. This group is surely no better able to organize effectively than the environmentalists. Thus a liberal compensation
policy is quite probably advantageous to the environmentalists' cause.
CONCLUDING APPRAISAL

Whatever the empirical rectitude of such specific points, Professor
Ackerman's analysis is a first-rate contribution to the establishment of
communication between philosophy and law. As such, it is a part of a
broader effort to bridge that gulf which has arisen over the last hundred
years or so between philosophy and the disciplines which are its offshoots.
The pattern of this connection, in the context of law and political analysis, is discoverable in the copious "Notes" that Ackerman provides.
Unfortunately, the importance of the subject is matched only by
what I perceive to be the difficulty of attracting the interest of persons in
the practice of law. In fact, hostility is to be expected from practitioners
since intellectual clarity, which exposes inconsistent ideas, often acts as a
limitation upon the availability of verbal tools for the accomplishment of
the client's and the judge's objectives. Although this effect may be offset
by the potential for sophisticated original analyses, one must wonder
whether jurists will ever decide that the pursuit of such possibilities is
20.

See id. at 54-56.
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economically preferable to the present convenient state of confusion.
DALE A. NANCE*

* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Stanford Law School. Presently in the Jurisprudence and
Social Policy Program at Boalt Hall, University of California (Berkeley).
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WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG-THE BRETHREN. New York, N.Y.
Simon and Schuster, 1979.
The United States Supreme Court is the most private of our public
institutions; and The Brethren, hyped as an investigative expos6 of the
Court's inner workings, has naturally excited great interest among both
the legal profession and the general public. The book is in fact a clerk's
eye view of the Court, for it was the clerks who were "Deep Throats" for
authors Armstrong and Woodward. The book is scarcely an expos6, however, for it reveals little that the average Court watcher did not already
know or suspect. It is nevertheless a significant book because it confirms
what until now one could only surmise from Court opinions and corridor
gossip: namely, that the present Court is corrupt to the core, from its
clerks to its Justices.
Since The Brethren could not have been written but for the clerks'
betrayal of confidences, their corruption is evident on every page. The
young men and women who obtain a Supreme Court clerkship know that
the mere fact of having clerked for a Justice will open many professional
doors to them. The clerks know, furthermore, that every Justice has
many connections and that he may open other professional doors for
them that would have otherwise remained closed. These are among the
chief reasons a young law graduate seeks a Supreme Court clerkship. A
clerk who trades on his position and his Justice's connections and then
talks behind the Justice's back demonstrates little sense of loyalty to the
Court or to the man. He also demonstrates an astonishing disregard for
the kind of confidentiality that is essential to the just and fair functioning
of the Court. During the tenure of these loose-lipped clerks, more than
one premature disclosure troubled the Court. On one such occasion, an
incensed Chief Justice suggested that the clerks be given lie-detector
tests. The clerks, incensed that the Chief doubted their integrity, protested. Like Lady Macbeth, they may have thought that if they bleated
loudly enough about their integrity, no one would notice its absence.
Perhaps the clerks simply believed that they, the creme de la creme
of recent law school graduates, were bound neither by the professional
rules that bind the ordinary lawyer nor even the normal social conventions that constrain decent human beings. They reek with self-importance. In their self-serving revelations, the clerks insinuate that but for
their prodigious research efforts and their indefatigable negotiations with
each other, the Court would not be able to function as well as it does.
They tell us that Stewart and Marshall are "lazy." Burger "can't remember," and Blackmun "can't decide." Rehnquist "distorts." White is a
"bully." And so on. The clear implication is that but for the hard-working
(very hard-working) and intelligent (very intelligent) clerks, these nine
badly flawed beings could not adequately discharge their responsibilities.
It strains credulity to believe that nine men as old, as experienced, and as
successful as Supreme Court Justices play pawn to not-yet-dry-behind-
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the-ears youngsters, however bright and energetic.
In fact, the battalion of clerks who now man the offices of the Justices may have contributed immeasurably to the declining quality of the
Court's work product. Concurring and dissenting opinions, which inevitably dilute the effectiveness of the Court's opinion, have proliferated in
direct proportion to the proliferation of clerks. Where once there was
none and then but one, there are now three or more clerks busy preparing
memoranda. Thereafter, the* Justices feel compelled to submit those
memoranda as a concurring or dissenting opinion as a reward, if nothing
else, to the clerk who has so diligently prepared the memorandum. Law
clerks are inordinately fond of confiding that the one good opinion of
Justice Woeful is in fact a product of their mind and pen.
A Justice may also avoid doing his own research or his own opinion
writing so long as he can assign those tasks to one of the ubiquitous
clerks. Indeed, he may come to act more as a senior partner in a law firm
than as a judge. His opinions may suffer as a result, for there is no "better
test for the solution of a case than its articulation in writing, which is
thinking at its hardest."' In many recent decisions, the Justices cannot
have thought as hard as they should have. Moreover, there is ample evidence in The Brethren that the Justices are not doing their work as it
ought to be done. That the clerks broke the trust which ought to have
bound them to Court and Justice is not perhaps so surprising in view of
their role models, for the Justices themselves have violated their duty to
decide cases according to the Constitution and the laws.
That one reviewer after another could conclude from this book that
the Court is not corrupt only demonstrates how little we have come to
expect of public officials in general and of judges in particular. Apparently it is enough that the Justices do not take bribes and still recuse
themselves from cases in which they have a personal stake. That they
decide cases on the basis of their personal assessments of what is good for
the country rather than on the basis of the Constitution and the laws
they have solemnly promised to uphold is apparently no cause for concern. Rather, it is cause for praise among those who agree with the results
which the Court decrees. Such critics invariably describe the Justices as
"statesmen"-that is, as men: who have exercised great political skill in
the management of government. However much such men may be needed
in public life, a Justice who faithfully discharges his responsibilities cannot satisfy that need. While the statesman must of necessity balance competing interests and reconcile them in a manner that advances the public
weal, the judge must perforce accept as a given, except in the rarest of
instances, the balance thereby struck. Even in those rare instances in
which he is obliged to overrule the balance struck in the contemporary
political process, he is justified only because he is enforcing another, earlier, and superior balance struck by the people in their Constitution. After all, the belief that Justices are constrained by the Constitution and
1. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 6, 1980, § 5, at 1, col. 5.
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the law alone justifies the discretionary authority they exercise. Any Justice who forsakes his oath to respect that constraint corrupts his high
office. By that criterion the present Court is corrupt, for its decisions represent the exercise of the statesman's will rather than a judge's reason.
Roe v. Wade,2 the abortion decision, is illustrative. In that case the
Court held that states could not generally prohibit abortions. Mr. Justice
Blackmun, who wrote for the. Court, conceded at the outset that people
differed deeply about the extent to which abortion should be permitted if
at all, that one's view on the question was influenced by his moral values,
and that any resolution of the question necessarily involved judgments
about many other related issues. In our system such complicated questions are resolved in the political process, and the courts must respect
and enforce any legislative resolution that does not violate the Constitution. It thus should not have surprised Mr. Justice Powell that the Constitution provided no guidance on the abortion question because it was
never intended to provide such guidance. Legislators who daily decide
myriad questions of public policy must look to sources other than the
Constitution for guidance; and they are presumably free to fashion
whatever solution commends itself to their collective judgment so long, of
course, as the solution does not violate the Constitution.
Instead of concluding that the Court should therefore defer to the
legislative judgment that a woman could not obtain an abortion except in
the most unusual circumstances, Armstrong and Woodward state that
Mr. Justice Powell allegedly concluded that he would have to vote his
"gut." Since he thought that the abortion laws were "atrocious," he would
vote to invalidate them if he could find a rationale. If the Justice meant
only that he would insist on some rationale that might reasonably be derived from constitutional text or precedent, his position might be defensible. Unfortunately, however, he had already concluded that the search for
a constitutional rationale would be futile. He was, then, looking not so
much for a rationale as a rationalization. In other words, he wanted to
conceal the real ground of decision-his personal belief that the abortion
laws were atrocious-with some clever legal rhetoric. Dishonest is the
most charitable way in which to describe that mode of deciding cases.
It is especially troubling that the Justice who is most consistently
described as an apostle of judicial restraint and who has been hailed as a
worthy successor to Mr. Justice Harlan (who, not surprisingly, was recognized by one of his colleagues as the only judge with whom he had ever
served), should so easily assume the role of statesman. Elsewhere, of
course, Justice Powell has assured us that he understands that judges
make law and that the belief that the Constitution and laws cabin his
discretion is a naive and quaint myth. The Justice learns quickly. He had
initially thought otherwise. In the death penalty cases, Powell thought
that the soundness of his legal argument would persuade his colleages
that the Constitution did not forbid capital punishment. But justices who
2.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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cheerfully embrace the role of statesmen care little about the mere soundness of a legal argument. They care only about the result. Thus Mr. Justice Marshall, ever alert to the problems of the poor, especially the black
poor, objected to an early draft of the abortion opinion which did not
make viability the determinative criterion because he feared states could
"effectively ban abortions in the [second trimester] under the guise of
protecting the woman's health." 3 Marshall apparently believed that a viability test would "better protect the rural poor.'"4 Were Justice Marshall a
Congressman, he might legitimately see himself as having been sent to
Washington by his poor black constituents to represent their interests.
The Court is not a third chamber of the national legislature, however; and
the Justice was not appointed (at least he should not have been appointed) to represent the interests of black men and women in Court
deliberations.
Of course the Justice may have been right as a matter of public policy that the poor should be able to obtain abortions as easily as the rich.
Additionally, he may have balanced the equities so sensitively and fairly
that he qualifies as a statesman. The rub is that he took an oath to judge
cases according to the Constitution, and one searches its text in vain for
any indication that viability is the constitutional test for determining
when a state may prohibit abortions. As in Miranda v. Arizona,5 where
the Court extrapolated from the guarantee against self-incrimination a
detailed code regulating police interrogation of criminal suspects, the
Court in Roe v. Wade extrapolates from the right to privacy a detailed
code regulating abortions. Under this constitutionally dictated legislative
scheme, the state may not prohibit abortions during the first trimester. It
may regulate them during the second trimester only to protect the
mother's health. In the last trimester, it may prohibit them. That the
right to privacy is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution does not preclude the Court from recognizing it as one of those ninth amendment
rights retained by the people, but it does underscore the obvious fact that
the Court would have to demonstrate that the right to privacy embraced
the right to abortion on demand. Whether Justice Blackmun's review of
historical practices in Rome, Greece, and seventeenth-century England
proves that line of thought is, to say the least, doubtful. Certain it is that
he could not have argued that abortion on demand reflected the evolving
traditions of the American people, the standard usually invoked when
text and history fail. At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, all fifty states
prohibited abortions. That fact alone might have given judges some
pause, but it would not trouble statesmen who thought that the community would nevertheless accept their decision. Indeed, pragmatic prediction of that kind is part of the statesman's art. Justice Stewart, for one,
had allegedly concluded that "[t]he public was ready for abortion re3.

B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG,THE BRETHREN 232 (1979).

4. Id.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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form." The fact that this alleged shift in public attitudes had not yet
manifested itself in any significant legislative revision of state abortion
laws apparently was irrelevant. What the Justice really meant was that
the public would accept abortion reform decreed by the Court.
Judges who decide cases on the basis of pragmatic predictions about
what the community will tolerate forget the obligations of their office and
constitute a menace to our civil liberties. A Court which husbands its
moral authority can and should assert that authority to protect the constitutional rights of individual citizens from infringement by the majority.
A Court of prudent statesmen will not, however, enforce constitutional
rights if they feel that the community will not tolerate their exercise.
Judicial statesmen will, for example, sustain the confinement of American
citizens in relocation centers for no reason other than that the citizens
have yellow skin and slanted eyes. The statesmen will sustain the lawfulness of investigative witch-hunts that invade the associational rights of
those whose left-wing views make them attractive scapegoats. In short, a
Court of statesmen follows the election returns rather than the
Constitution.
Typically, the Justices do not admit that they act as statesmen
rather than judges. With a disingenuousness all too characteristic of the
Court's recent work product, Justice Blackmun intoned piously in the
opening passages of his Roe v. Wade opinion:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection .... We bear in mind, too,

Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition [that the Constitution] "is made for
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes '1embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
Contrary to his assertion, Blackmun did not decide the case on the basis
of constitutional text, tradition, or principle. The first draft of his opinion
"did not settle on any analytical framework [and did not] explain on what
basis [he] had arrived at the apparent conclusion that women had a right
to privacy, and thus a right to abortion."8 Whatever their personal reasons for favoring the result (Justice Stewart was said to have concluded
that abortion was a reasonable solution to the population problem!), the
Justices seized almost as an afterthought upon the conveniently vague
right to privacy as a justification for their decision. The but-recently-discovered right had apparently been written into the Constitution in an
invisible ink discernable only to the eye of judicial statesmen like Justice
Douglas who had first reported discovering it in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Douglas was pleased now that "[t]he right to privacy was being given con6. THE BRETHREN,supra note 3, at 167.
7. 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973).
8. THE BRETHREN, supra note 3, at 183.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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stitutional foundation in a major opinion."' 10 One would have thought
that the document rather than the Court gave a particular right its constitutional foundation, but that is perhaps a mere technicality that troubles only judges who take too narrow-i.e., unstatesmanlike-a view of
their responsibilities.
In truth, facts rather than constitutional principle or tradition
proved decisive. Mr. Justice Blackmun, having closeted himself in the library of the Mayo Clinic during the Court's summer recess, decided that
abortions could be performed safely. Mr. Justice Powell, who also devoted
his summer recess to a study of the abortion problem, decided that medically performed abortions were better than "unsanitary butchers and
coat-hanger abortions.""' Both conclusions seem eminently reasonable,
but the question the Justices never seemed to have asked themselves was
whether those facts were constitutionally relevant. While such facts might
well convince a legislature to adopt an abortion statute much like the one
imposed by the Court, they do not by themselves establish the existence
of a constitutional right to abortion. The Court simply cannot assume
that its conception of sound social policy is embodied in the Constitution.
That is precisely what Holmes meant in the passage from his Lochner
dissent 2 quoted by Justice Blackmun. Justice Holmes, the "Great Dissenter," believed that the Justices misconstrued the due process clause
when they read it to forbid wage and hour legislation merely because they
thought the legislation unwise. He would have shaken his head in disbelief to see his argument cited as authority for the proposition that the
Court could construe a nonexistent clause of the Constitution to forbid
abortion legislation merely because it thought the legislation unwise.
As The Brethren makes all too clear, the Court routinely decides
cases in the same manner in which it decided Roe. In Frontierov. Richardson 3 Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a plurality opinion which he knew4
would have [had] the effect of enacting the Equal Rights Amendment."'
He allegedly saw "no reason to walt several years for the states to ratify
the amendment."' 5 In the Richmond desegregation case Mr. Justice
Stewart reportedly "was .

.

. deeply affected by nonjudicial considera-

tions"'A-in particular, the fgct that "[tihe mainstream of society opposed forced integration of the schools when it meant busing.' 7 Since
Mr. Justice Marshall viewed capital punishment as "a penalty designed
for poor minorities and the under-educated [and] the ultimate form of
racial discrimination,'" his vote to abolish such punishment in Furman
10.

THE BRETHREN,

supra note 3, at 235.

11. Id. at 230.
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905).
13. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
14. THE BRETHREN, supra note 3, at 254.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 205.
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v. Georgia"9 was foreordained. Thus do those who have sworn to do justice to the rich and poor alike dispose of the cases entrusted to their decision under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
That almost all Justices have acted, at least on occasion, as statesmen does not justify the practice, though it may be thought to render any
protest against the practice futile, if not naive. If the Justice's perception
of his role affects the way in which he decides cases, however, the protest
is neither futile nor naive. A Justice who believes that he is obliged to
decide cases in conformity with the Constitution will often reach a different result from a Justice who believes that he is free to decide cases in
conformity with prevailing notions of sound public policy. On the basis of
The Brethren, one can only conclude that we have at last reaped what
the legal realists sowed-a Court of statesmen who believe that they cannot escape their own biases and prejudices and who therefore have decided to indulge rather than to restrain them. The prospect is not bright
that this Court will help maintain here what has so rarely survived anywhere-a government of laws rather than of men.
JAMES
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